Evaluating Opportunities When People are Uncertainty Averse

We consider the problem of ranking sets of alternatives. Standard approaches to this problem regard the addition of an alternative to a set containing one element as enhancing choice. We argue that this monotonicity axiom may not be desirable when an agent is uncertain as to the value of this additional alternative. We replace monotonicity with an uncertainty aversion axiom, and also introduce an axiom that produces lexicographic behaviour. These axioms, in conjunction with an independence axiom, enable us to prove a characterisation theorem. This theorem says that sets are ranked in terms of the number of uncertain elements that they contain, the fewer the better. This is the only ranking rule that satisfies our axioms.

U.S Presidential Elections and the Referendum Paradox*

In the United States, the president is elected by the Electoral Col- lege (EC) and not directly by individual voters. This can give rise to a so-called referendum paradox in which one candidate receives more popular votes than any other, but this candidate is not elected. The 2000 election is an example of this phenomenon. Can the EC be reformed so that a referendum paradox never arises? We consider vary- ing three natural parameters. First, we consider changing the method of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives to states. Sec- ond, we consider changing the total number of seats in the House. Intuition suggests that as the number of seats approaches the number

Even without ‘Senate’ electoral votes, the size of the U.S. House of Representatives could still determine the outcome of presidential elections

Earlier this year on this blog, Fabrice Barthélémy, Mathieu Martin, and Ashley Piggins showed that under the Electoral College system, the arbitrary size of the House of Representatives, not the voters, can determine the outcome of a presidential election. They referred to work by Nicholas R. Miller to explain this ‘House size effect.’ Here he further explores the issue and writes that, even without ‘Senate’ electoral votes, the winner of the electoral vote could still depend on the size of the House

Ferguson shows us that in contemporary America, black citizenship is not comparable to that of others and life is not secure or guaranteed

Late on Friday evening, a Grand Jury in Ferguson Missouri reached a decision not to indict police officer Darren Wilson in the killing of a black teenager, Mike Brown, in August. Shana Redmond writes that the decision is another example of the system acting to preserve itself at the expense of black communities. In the aftermath of the decision, which has seen widespread protests, state officials and police have reacted by asserting their commitment to the protection of property, rather than engaging with the protestors or their concerns. With protests spreading to other cities, she argues that for many, the events in Ferguson have become a symbol of the daily brutality of racism in America

The size of the House of Representatives, not the American people, can determine the outcome of presidential elections

After the 2000 presidential election, in which Al Gore won the majority of the popular vote, but not the election, there have been perennial discussions of the merit of using the Electoral College to elect the President. Fabrice Barthélémy, Mathieu Martin, and Ashley Piggins examine the so-called “referendum paradox” that resulted in the Bush victory and its effect on other presidential elections. They show that because of the Electoral College, the arbitrary size of the House of Representatives, not the voters, can determine the outcome of a presidential election

Oligarchy and soft incompleteness

The assumption that the social preference relation is complete is demanding. We distinguish between “hard” and “soft” incompleteness, and explore the social choice implications of the latter. Under soft incompleteness, social preferences can take values in the unit interval. We motivate interest in soft incompleteness by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the context of a [0, 1]-valued social preference relation. Using a novel approach to the quasi-transitivity of this relation we prove a general oligarchy theorem. Our framework allows us to make a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable

Oligarchy and soft incompleteness

The assumption that the social preference relation is complete is demanding. We distinguish between “hard” and “soft” incompleteness, and explore the social choice implications of the latter. Under soft incompleteness, social preferences can take values in the unit interval. We motivate interest in soft incompleteness by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the context of a [0, 1]-valued social preference relation. Using a novel approach to the quasi-transitivity of this relation we prove a general oligarchy theorem. Our framework allows us to make a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable

Sen cycles and externalities

It has long been understood that externalities of some kind are responsible for Sen’s (1970) theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. However, Saari and Petron (2006) show that for any social preference cycle generated by combining the weak Pareto principle and individual decisiveness, every decisive individual must suffer at least one strong negative externality. We show that this fundamental result only holds when individual preferences are strict. Building on their contribution, we prove a general theorem for the case of weak preferences

A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy

We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite)

Armor or Withdraw? Likely Litigation and Potential Adjudication of Shoreland Conflicts Along Michigan\u27s Shifting Great Lake Coasts

Michigan enjoys along its inland seas, the Laurentian Great Lakes, one of the longest coastlines in the U.S. Much of that shoreline is privately owned. Because of a confluence of development pressures and irrepressible physical dynamics, growing numbers of Great Lakes shoreland properties, built on shifting sandy shores, are at heightened risk of loss from coastal storm surge, inundation, erosion, and shoreline recession. In response, property owners are installing extensive hardened shoreline armoring structures like seawalls and revetments to arrest those erosional processes. Those structures, however, will substantially impair, if not ultimately destroy, the state’s natural coastal beaches and other shoreland resources, as well as accelerate erosion of neighboring shoreland properties. The clash of imperatives to protect shoreland properties versus conserve coastal resources signifies a wicked dilemma the State cannot avoid: armor or withdraw? More precisely, should we allow the armoring of Michigan’s Great Lakes shorelines in an attempt to fix in place shoreland properties, at great and ongoing private and public expense, and ultimately risk the loss of public trust resources? Or should we allow—and should we compel shoreland property owners to allow—natural processes to proceed, even though doing so will increase the rate at which privately owned shorelands naturally convert into state-owned submerged bottomlands? We cannot hope to simultaneously protect both the beach and the beach house along naturally receding Great Lakes shorelines; we must choose which interest to prioritize first, recognizing the cost of doing so by losing the other. In addition to the complex physical dynamics at play along Michigan’s Great Lakes coasts, there are evolving legal complexities as well. The State, as sovereign, enjoys police power authorities that encompass coastal shoreland management. The State has also long recognized the applicability of the public trust doctrine to its Great Lakes shores, and its constitution mandates the protection of natural resources. This article first analyzes current Michigan law to determine how those doctrines and mandates apply to Great Lakes shoreline armoring, particularly in terms of what to prioritize. Based on that assessment, we conclude that Michigan’s courts, legislature, and people have consistently and clearly prioritized protecting and conserving Great Lakes natural coastal resources above developing or impairing them for private use, except when such development truly serves larger public trust interests. In contrast, the administrative rules now used to execute those protections prioritize protecting the private beach house first, even at the expense of destroying the natural beach and impairing other public trust interests. This administrative approach was not inevitable— indeed it may be unlawful—and it has created strong expectations on the part of shoreland property owners, heightening the likelihood of litigation. The article then analyzes current Michigan law to determine how the courts might resolve disputes between property owners hoping to armor the shore and State or local constraints on such armoring. Here we find that while the Michigan courts have resolved a number of key questions regarding coastal shorelands, there is no caselaw addressing directly the lawfulness of shoreline armoring. Based on our review of relevant caselaw, we conclude the courts are not likely to find that the State lacks authority to regulate—or prohibit altogether—shoreline armoring to protect coastal resources. There is conflicting caselaw, however, upon which the courts could rely to find either that the current regulatory regime provides adequate protection of coastal resources, or alternatively that it is deficient. Finally, beyond questions of regulatory authority, the courts are not likely to find that reinvigorated regulatory efforts to prevent the destruction and impairment of public trust coastal resources from armoring—even those resulting in the accelerated loss of private properties—violate constitutional protections, especially if State reforms are undertaken with deliberation and care. If the courts conclude that current regulatory efforts are lawful and require no greater protection, then Michigan will likely see much of its Great Lakes shorelines armored and its natural coastal beaches destroyed. If they conclude that current regulatory efforts are deficient (or if they approve of reinvigorated protection efforts), however, then private shoreland properties may be lost to the lakes. Such losses cannot be avoided forever, especially along naturally receding shorelines, but they might occur sooner than would happen absent attempts to arrest shoreline erosion with armoring. As with most wicked policy dilemmas, the best response may not be at either extreme—always armor or always withdraw—but somewhere in between. Crafting that hybrid approach, and the appropriate rules for applying it, will be the most challenging course to navigate